Process mining is a family of techniques for analysing business processes based on event logs extracted from information systems. Mainstream process mining tools are designed for intra-organizational settings, insofar as they assume that an event log is available for processing as a whole. The use of such tools for inter-organizational process analysis is hampered by the fact that such processes involve independent parties who are unwilling to, or sometimes legally prevented from, sharing detailed event logs with each other. In this setting, this paper proposes an approach for constructing and querying a common type of artefact used for process mining, namely the frequency and time-annotated Directly-Follows Graph (DFG), over multiple event logs belonging to different parties, in such a way that the parties do not share the event logs with each other. The proposal leverages an existing platform for secure multiparty computation, namely Sharemind. Since a direct implementation of DFG construction in Sharemind suffers from scalability issues, the paper proposes to rely on vectorization of event logs and to employ a divide-and-conquer scheme for parallel processing of sub-logs. The paper reports on an experimental evaluation that tests the scalability of the approach on real-life logs.
Introduction
Analysing business processes based on event logs extracted from information systems through process mining techniques [1] becomes increasingly popular in industry. It enables organizations to optimize their processes and achieve their strategic goals, e.g., realizing cost-efficient process execution. However, in practise, many business processes are not restricted to a single organization, but are executed by several collaborating organizations. We call such processes inter-organizational business processes. An example of such a process is given in Figure 1 , which illustrates the ground handling of an aircraft. The process includes two independent parties, the airline and the ground handler (called "airport" in the model).
Due to confidentiality concerns as well as privacy regulations, such as GDPR 4 and HIPAA 5 , it is not always possible for organizations to share their process data with each other. Indeed, exchanging event logs may reveal personal information of customers and expose business secrets. As a consequence, common techniques for process mining cannot be employed for inter-organizational business processes, despite the fact that these processes can have a large impact of the core operation of a business. With reference to the aforementioned scenario, for instance, it is well-known that the orchestration of ground handling activities is of crucial importance for both involved parties. It determines the number of flights an airport can operate and the number of flights an airline can offer per aircraft.
In this paper, we focus on the question of how to enable process mining for inter-organizational business processes without requiring the involved parties to share their private event logs or trust a third party. To this end, we propose an architecture for process mining based on secure multi-party computation (MPC) [38] . In essence, MPC aims at the realization of some computation over data from multiple parties, while exposing only the result of the computation, but keeping the input data private. We consider the setting of an MPC platform where the involved parties upload their event logs to a network of compute nodes. Before the upload, secret sharing algorithms locally split each single data value into different parts (i.e., shares) that are then stored at different nodes. Since each share does not provide any information about the original data, the uploaded event log is encrypted and exposed neither to the platform operator nor other involved parties. Nonetheless, the MPC platform enables the computation over the encrypted data through protocols for result sharing among the nodes.
We realise the above architecture to answer analysis queries that are common in process mining. Specifically, we show how to construct a frequency and timeannotated Directly-Follows Graph (DFG), which is a starting point for process discovery algorithms [5] and for answering various performance analysis questions, such as finding the top-k bottlenecks (i.e. activities with longer cycle time) or the top-k most frequent hand-offs. We implement our proposed architecture using the Sharemind platform [9] . In order to tackle scalability issues that would be imposed by a naive implementation, we employ vectorization of event logs and propose a divide-and-conquer scheme for parallel processing of sub-logs. We test the effectiveness of these optimisations via an experimental evaluation with real-world event logs.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out related work and the background for this work. Section 3 introduces our architecture for privacypreserving inter-organizational process mining along with the optimizations needed for efficient implementation. An experimental evaluation is presented in Section 4, before Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background and Related Work
In the remainder, we review work on privacy-preserving process mining, interorganizational process mining, and secure multi-party computation.
Privacy-Preserving Process Mining
The necessity of privacy-preserving process mining, due to novel legal development such as the GDPR, was recently discussed in [27, 28] . In general, two approaches have been established [16] : (i) anonymizing the event data to apply standard techniques to it, and (ii) directly incorporating privacy considerations in process mining techniques. The anonymization of event logs from one organization may be done using PRETSA [17] , an algorithm to ensure the established privacy notions of k-anonymity [33] and t-closeness [24] . These notions, based on data similarity, are widely adopted and offer protection against certain attacks [37] , like the disclosure of the identity of individuals involved in the dataset. Approaches based on cryptography [13, 30] have also been proposed. Following the idea to incorporate privacy guarantees directly in process mining techniques, algorithms for privacypreserving process discovery [26, 34, 35] and the privacy-aware discovery of resource roles [29] have been proposed. Recently, techniques for privacy-preserving process mining, following either of the aforementioned paradigms, have been made available for a large audience with the tool ELPaaS [6] .
All of the aforementioned techniques, with the exception of [35] , concern process mining for a single organization and have not yet adopted or evaluated for an inter-organizational setting. While the focus of [35] is on an inter-organizational setting, the approach targets solely the generation of a process model, while our aim is answering a wide range of analysis queries about a business process.
Inter-Organizational Process Mining
Several approaches consider inter-organizational process mining, with a focus on process model discovery, but neglect privacy aspects, see [31, 39] . Another line of related research in inter-organizational process mining attends to compare the same process in different organizations [2, 12, 36] .
The specific problem of privacy in inter-organizational process mining has been addressed by Liu et al. [25] . They provide a respective framework based on the assumption that a trusted third party exists. They then focus on discovery of process models. In our work, we do not assume the existence of such a trusted third party and target the computation of answers to analysis queries over event logs in a privacy-preserving manner.
Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) [19] is a cryptographic functionality that allows n parties to cooperatively evaluate (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for some function f , with the i-th party contributing the input x i and learning the output y i , and no party or an allowed coalition of parties learning nothing besides their own inputs and outputs.
There exist a few different approaches for constructing MPC protocols. Homomorphic secret sharing [32] is currently the most common basis for MPC protocols [14, 18] . In such protocols, the arithmetic or Boolean circuit representing f is evaluated gate-by-gate, constructing secret-shared outputs of gates from their secret-shared inputs. Each evaluation requires some communication between parties (except for addition gates), hence the depth of the circuit determines the round complexity of the protocol. On the other hand, there exist protocols with low communication complexity [10, 3, 15] , allowing the secure computation of quite complex functions f , as long as the circuit implementing it has a low multiplicative depth.
The complexity of MPC protocols is heavily dependent on the number of parties jointly performing the computations. Hence the typical deployment of MPC has a relatively small number of compute nodes, also known as computation parties, (typically just 2 or 3) actually running the protocols for evaluating gates, while an unbounded number of parties may contribute the inputs and/or receive the outputs of the computation [21] . There exist frameworks that support such deployments of MPC, they have APIs to simplify the development of privacypreserving applications [4] . One of such frameworks is Sharemind [9] , whose main protocol set [10] is based on secret-sharing among three computing parties. In this paper, we build on top of Sharemind and its large number of primitive protocols and subroutines [8] , but our techniques are also applicable to other secret sharing based MPC systems. Sharemind framework simplifies our work by offering the SecreC language [7] for programming privacy-preserving applications, abstracting away these details of cryptographic protocols that make sense to be abstracted away.
Multi-Party Computation based Process Mining
This section introduces our techniques for process mining based on secure multiparty computation. Section 3.1 first clarifies our model for inter-organizational process mining including the required input data and the obtained analysis results. We then introduce our architecture for realizing the respective analysis using secure multi-party computation in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we elaborate on vectorization and parallelization to improve the efficiency of our approach.
Model for Inter-organizational Process Mining
We consider a model in which an event log L = {e 1 , . . . , e n } is defined as a set of events e = (i, a, ts), each capturing a single execution of an activity a at time ts, as part of a single instance i of the business process. Grouping events by the latter and ordering them according to their timestamp enables the construction of traces t = e 1 , . . . , e m , i.e., single executions of the process, so that we refer to i also as the trace identifier.
For an inter-organizational business process, an event log that records the process execution from start to end is commonly not available. Rather, different parties record sub-logs, built of events that denote activity executions at the respective party. To keep the notation concise, we consider a setting in which two parties, I a and I b , execute an inter-organizational process, e.g., the airport and the airline in our motivating example. Then, each of the two parties records an event log, denoted by L a and L b . Each of these logs is the projection of L on the events that denote activity executions at the respective parties I a and I b . We assume that each activity can only be executed by one of the parties, so that this projection is defined unambiguously.
For the above setting, we consider the scenario that the parties I a and I b want to answer some analysis queries Q over the inter-organizational event log L, yet without sharing their logs L a and L b with each other. More specifically, we focus on analysis queries that can be answered on a frequency or time-annotated DFG of the inter-organizational process. The basic DFG captures the frequencies with which the executions of two activities have been observed to directly follow each other in a trace. Moreover, we consider temporal annotations of the directlyfollows dependencies in terms of time between the respective activity executions. Queries over the frequency and time-annotated DFGs allow us to analyze the main paths of the process, the rarely executed paths, as well as the activities that most contribute to delays in a process. Note though that only query answers are to be revealed whereas the actual DFG shall be kept private.
Formally, the time-annotated DFG is captured by an |A|×|A| matrix, where A is the set of all possible activities of the process. Each cell contains a tuple (c, ∆). The counter c represents the frequency with which a directly-follows dependency has been observed in L, i.e., for the cell (a 1 , a 2 ) it is the number of times that two events e 1 = (i 1 , a 1 , ts 1 ) and e 2 = (i 2 , a 2 , ts 2 ) follow each other directly in some trace (i.e., i 1 = i 2 ) of L. Also, ∆ is the total sum of the time passed by between all occurrences of the respective events, i.e., ts 2 − ts 1 for the above events.
In inter-organizational process mining, the aforementioned time-annotated DFG cannot be computed directly, as this would require the two parties to share and integrate their sub-logs.
MPC Architecture for Process Mining
To enable inter-organizational process mining without requiring parties to share their event logs with each other, we propose an architecture based on secure multi-party computation (MPC). As outlined in Figure 2 , we rely on a platform for MPC (in our case Sharemind [9] ) that takes the event logs of the participating parties, i.e., L a and L b , as secret-shared input. Inside the MPC platform, the respective data is processed in a privacy-preserving way in order to answer analysis queries over the time-annotated DFG computed from that data. We summarize the functionality realized in the MPC platform as follows:
Combination. The parties upload their event logs L a and L b to the MPC platform in a secret-shared manner. That is, the values (i, a, ts) of each event (encoded as integers) are split into shares, which do not provide any information on the original values and are stored at different nodes of the platform. This way, each party can only see the total number of records uploaded by each party, but not the particular data. Subsequently, the logs are unified creating a single log of events L. Sorting. To calculate the annotated DFG, we have to determine which events follow each other in a trace by grouping the events by their trace identifier and ordering them by their timestamp. Since the trace identifier is secretshared, we cannot group events directly. Instead, we use a privacy-preserving quicksort algorithm [8, 20] as implemented in Sharemind to sort the events by their trace identifier. Applying the same algorithm also to the secret-shared timestamps then ensures that the events of the same trace follow each other in the order of their timestamps.
DFG matrix calculation. Next, we construct the DFG matrix inside the MPC platform, keeping it secret. Since the information on the activity of an event is secret-shared, we cannot simply process the events of traces sequentially as the matrix cell to update would not be known. Hence, we adopt a onehot encoding for activities, so that each possible activity is represented by a binary vector of length |A|. To mask the actual number of possible activities, the set over which the vector is defined may further include some padding, i.e., the vector length can be chosen to be larger than |A|. Now, if we compute the outer product of such vectors for activities a 1 and a 2 , we get a mask matrix M such that M [a 1 , a 2 ] = 1, while all other entries are 0. For all sequential pairs of events in the sorted log, we sum up these matrices together to get the frequency count c of the directly-follows dependency for (a 1 , a 2 ). Multiplying M by the difference of corresponding timestamps further enables us to derive the total sum of time passed, i.e., ∆, between the respective activity executions. Technically, the outer product is a function that is realized as a protocol over secret-shared data in Sharemind, and its run-time complexity is linear in |A| [23] . However, the above approach could mix up events of different traces. We therefore also compute a flag b that is 1 if the trace identifiers of two events are equivalent, and 0 otherwise. Then, we multiply the mask matrix M by b, so that the values of M are ignored if b = 0. Again, the functionality for comparison and multiplication can be traced back to predefined protocols in Sharemind [10] . Algorithm 1 summarizes computation of the annotated DFG from the sorted, combined log L, where [[·]] denotes a secret-shared data value. Query answering. A query Q defines a subset S of the annotated DFG, which is generated by the MPC platform and revealed to the participating parties. Through sharing solely the S, but not the complete annotated DFG, we are able to limit the amount of information each party can learn about the process. As an example, consider the query to derive the top-5 most frequent activities. Based on the secret-shared DFG, the respective activities may be identified through grouping and sorting the events, similar to the procedure outlined above, which is again based on the predefined protocols of an MPC platform such as Sharemind.
Performance Optimizations
Inter-organizational process mining using the above general architecture might suffer from scalability issues. The reason is that privacy-preserving computation through protocols over secret-shared data is inevitably less efficient than computation in plain. Hence, even for functions that have a generally low run-time complexity (O(n) for the combination, O(n log(n)) for the sorting, O(nm 2 ) for the calculation of the annotated DFG, where n is the log length and m is the number of activities), there is a non-negligible overhead induced by MPC. For instance, a naive realisation of the quicksort algorithm to sort events would require O(n log(n)) rounds of communication between the nodes and O(n log(n)) Algorithm value comparisons per round [20] . We therefore consider two angles to improve the efficiency of the analysis, namely vectorization and parallelization.
Vectorization. Computation that adopts a single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) approach is highly recommended in MPC applications. Since MPC assumes continuous interaction between distributed nodes, the number of communication rounds shall be reduced as much as possible. For instance, while computing n multiplications sequentially would result in n rounds of communication, one may alternatively multiply element-wise two vectors of length n, for which one round of network communication is sufficient. Sharemind offers efficient protocols for such vector-based functions [22, 23] .
Parallelization. Further runtime improvements are obtained by parallelizing the algorithm itself. Again, our goal is to reduce the number of rounds of communication among the nodes of the MPC platform. We therefore split the input data into chunks, such that all chunks can be processed independently from each other. In our scenario, this is done by grouping the party logs by trace, or by a group of traces, generating an annotated DFG for group, and finally integrating the different DFGs. Since events with the same trace will never occur in different chunks, instead of sorting one log of length n, we will need to sort c chunks of length n/c each. Since communication complexity of a privacy-preserving quicksort is O(n · log n) [20] , this improves efficiency.
The above approach raises the question of determining the size of the chunks. Separating each trace reveals the total number of events of that trace provided by a party, which may be critical from a privacy perspective. On the other hand, a small chunk size reduces the overhead of sorting. This leads to a trade-off between runtime performance and privacy considerations.
However, in our current implementation, it is necessary that all chunks have the same length, as Sharemind allows parallel sorting only for equal-length vectors. Therefore, we apply a padding to the traces in the log, adding dummy events (for which the activity is represented by an empty vector in the one-hot encoding, so that the events are ignored for the DFG calculation) until the number of events of the longest trace is reached. Such padding may be employed locally, by each party, and also has the benefit that the length of individual traces is not revealed.
Evaluation
We implemented the proposed approach on top of the Sharemind multi-party computation platform. 6 The source code of our implementation is available at https://github.com/Elkoumy/shareprom. The implementation is written using the SecreC programming language supported by Sharemind.
Using this implementation, we conducted experiments to evaluate the proposed approaches in order to address the following research questions: RQ1: How do the characteristics of the input event logs influence the performance of the secure multi-party computation of the DFG? RQ2: What is the effect of increasing the number of parallel chunks on the performance of the multi-party computation of the DFG?
Datasets
The proposed approach is designed to compute the DFG of a process where the event log is distributed across multiple parties, each party being responsible for executing a subset of the activities (i.e. event types) of the process. We are not aware of publicly available real-life datasets with this property. We identified a collection of synthetic inter-organizational business process event logs [11] but these logs are too small to allow us to conduct performance experiments (a few dozen traces per log). On the other hand, there is a collection of real-life event logs of intra-organizational processes comprising logs of varying sizes and characteristics. 7 . From this collection, we selected three logs of increasing size and complexity (cf. Table 1) :
Credit Requirement This event log comes from a process for background checking for the purpose of granting credit at a Dutch bank. It contains of short traces with only 8 event types. It has a simple control-flow structure: All traces follow the same sequence of activities. Traffic Fines This event log comes from a process to collect payment of fines from traffic law violations at a local police office in Italy. It consists of a higher number of traces (and distinct pathways) but the traces are short and the number of event types is small. BPIC 2017 This event log captures a loan application process at a Dutch financial institute. It contains traces with a higher length than the other two and contains a larger number of event types.
To simulate an inter-organizational setting, we use a round-robin approach to assign each event type (activity) in the log to one of two parties. Hence, each party executes half of the event types. The experiments were timed-out at 5 hours. The BPIC 2017 could not be handled with this time-out. Accordingly, we selected 1000 traces randomly from this event log to enable processing of the log below the time-out.
Experimental Setup
To answer the above questions, we use three performance measures:
• Latency. We define latency as the amount of time needed to transform the event logs of the two parties securely into an annotated DFG. We report both, the total execution time and the time needed by the chunk-based sort. • Throughput. We define throughput as the number of events that the system can process per minute. • Communication Overhead. We define the communication overhead as the amount of data transferred between the computing parties during the multi-party computation. We measure the average of the data sent and received. We report the values individually for each compute node.
We performed five runs of each experiment. We report the average maximum values for latency and the average value for both throughput and communication overhead, across the five runs. We used Nethogs 8 to measure the communication overhead and we report the average value per compute node. The experiments were run in an environment with three physical servers as compute nodes. All of them use the same Sharemind setup. Each server has an AMD Processor 6276 and 192 GB RAM and all the servers are connected using a 1GB Ethernet switch.
The experiments focus on the time needed to construct the annotated DFG, since it is the most sophisticated and time-consuming portion of the proposed analysis pipeline, due to the communicating required between the compute nodes. Once the annotated DFG is available, stored in a secret-shared manner, the calculation of the actual queries has a lower complexity.
Results
Latency Experiment. In Figure 3 , we illustrate the observed execution time when varying the number of chunks used in the parallelization. We plot a bar for each chunk size. Each bar represents the execution time of parallel sort in blue and the execution time of the DFG calculation in orange. From Figure 3 , we conclude that the execution time decreases with an increasing number of chunks, due to the parallel sorting of chunks. We also note that the execution time for the DFG calculation stays constant. Our results are consistent for all event logs. Regarding RQ1, we summarise that the proportion of execution time between sorting and DFG calculation differs based on the event log characteristics. For the log with the largest number of event types (BPIC2017) the DFG calculation makes up the largest proportion of the total execution time, while the proportion is significantly lower for the logs with a smaller number of event types. A possible explanation for this finding is the increasing size of the vectors required to represent each activity, due to our bit-vector representation. Such increase results in more computational heavy calculations.
Regarding RQ2, we conclude that the latency decreases for event logs with an increasing number of chunks. Throughput Experiment. In Figure 4 , we report the number of processed events per second when varying the number of chunks. We find a consistent improvement for the throughput across all event logs. However, our results also correlate with the finding of Figure 3 , since throughput and latency correlate with each other. The dataset with the highest decrease in latency (Credit Requirements) is also the event log with the highest increase in throughput, while it is the other way around for the event log with the lowest decrease in latency (BPIC2017). Furthermore, these results provide additional evidence for RQ2 and strengthen our argument that an increasing number of chunks improves the performance. Communication Overhead. In Figure 5 , we present the amount of data transferred to each server, again also varying the number of chunks. We observe that the communication overhead decreases with an increase in the number of chunks. These findings confirm our earlier findings regarding RQ2. In summary, a higher number of chunks leads to improved performance across all three measures.
Conclusion
This paper introduced a framework for inter-organizational process mining based on secure multi-party computation. The framework enables two or more parties to perform basic process mining operations over the partial logs of an interorganisational process held by each party, without any information being shared besides: (i) the output of the queries that the parties opt to disclose; and (ii) three high-level log statistics: the number of traces per log, the number of event types, and the maximum trace length. The paper specifically focuses on the computation of the DFG, annotated with frequency and temporal information. This is a basic structure used by process mining tools to perform various operations, including automated process discovery and various performance analysis queries (e.g. top-k bottlenecks and least-frequent and most-frequent flow dependencies).
To mitigate the high performance overhead commonly observed for secure multi-party computation, we introduced two optimizations over the basic DFG computation algorithm: one based on vectorization of the event log and the other based on a divide-and-conquer strategy, where the log is processed in chunks.
An evaluation using real world event logs shows that with these optimizations, it is possible to compute the DFG of real-life logs with execution times that make this technique usable in practice. The divide-and-conquer approach provides opportunities to scale up the proposed technique by using a map-reduce execution style, however not to a sufficient level to enable interactive process mining (which requires execution times in the order of seconds). In future work, we will explore further optimizations, for example by taking into account metadata about the event types in the event log where hand-offs occur between participants. If such event types are known, and usually they are since these events correspond to message exchanges, it becomes possible to split the logs into a "private" part and a "public" part (the latter being the points where hand-offs occur), and to process them separately using different approaches.
Another avenue for future work is to combine the proposed approach with approaches that provide complementary guarantees such as differential privacy techniques. The latter techniques allow us to noisify the DFG or to the outputs of the queries of the DFG in order to limit the information leaked by these outputs.
